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Abstract ― We discuss the effects of rising shareholder power on distribution and 
capital accumulation in a Kaleckian model. Increasing shareholder power is 
associated with decreasing managements’ animal spirits, on the one hand, and 
increasing dividends distributed to shareholders, on the other hand. In the short 
run, increasing shareholder power may either have positive (‘finance-led’), 
negative (‘normal’) or intermediate (‘profits without investment’) effects on 
capacity utilisation, profits and capital accumulation. In the medium run, the 
positive (‘finance-led’) effects may be maintained in a stable environment under 
very special conditions, whereas the negative (‘normal’) and the intermediate 
(‘profits without investment’) effects turn into cumulative disequilibrium processes 
with falling rates of capacity utilisation, profits and capital accumulation and rising 
debt- and rentiers’ equity-capital-ratios. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The recent decades have seen major changes in the financial sectors of developed and 
developing countries.1 Generally, we have observed a drastic increase in the degree of 
financial intermediation and the development of new financial instruments, triggered by 
national and international legal liberalisation and by the development of new communication 
technologies. The overall importance of financial factors for real investment and growth of 
non-financial business has increased. This has been accompanied by an increasing activity of 
commercial banks in non-credit financial business and increasing financial activity of the non-
financial business sector. Finally, the power of shareholders in joint stock companies seems to 
have increased vis-à-vis management and labourers (Lazonick/O’Sullivan 2000). 
 
Whereas nowadays there seems to exist a broad consensus among macroeconomists of 
different schools of thought saying that the development of the financial sector of an economy 
is crucial for real economic growth, there remains equally wide disagreement as to which kind 
of financial structure and institutions are conducive to growth, and which are not. Therefore, 
it comes with no surprise that also the effects of the recent trends in the development of the 
financial sector on distribution and growth are viewed differently.  
 
Modern mainstream models, based on a synthesis of new ‘endogenous’ growth theory and 
new information economics, generally hold – albeit with different emphasis with respect to 
the relative importance of banks and financial markets – that the degree of financial 
                                                 
1 See for example the overview in Eatwell/Taylor (2000) for an early analysis, Krippner (2005) and the 
contributions in Epstein (2005) for a detailed treatment of the development in the US and other countries, van 
Treeck/Hein/Dünhaupt (2007) and van Treeck (2008a) for a comparison of the macroeconomics of 
‘financialisation’ in the US and Germany, and Stockhammer (2007) for the development in Europe. 
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intermediation should be positively associated with long-run growth.2 However, these models 
are rather limited when it comes to taking into account the recent ‘financialisation’ processes 
as sketched above because they have neither a role to play for effective demand in the long 
run nor for distribution conflict between different social groups or classes.  
 
Post-Keynesian demand driven distribution and growth models, based on the notion of 
distribution conflict between different groups, have been more sceptical with respect to the 
real effects of increasing financial intermediation, and rising shareholder power and 
shareholder value orientation of non-financial business inherent in these developments.3 
Different aspects of the ‘financialisation’ processes have been stressed in these models: 
 
First, the effects of financialisation on firms’ investment behaviour have been discussed. As a 
general proposition, it has been argued that policies of ‘retain and invest’ are likely to be 
gradually replaced by policies of ‘downsize and distribute’ in the process of ‘financialisation’ 
(Lazonick/O’Sullivan 2000). In particular, Crotty (1990) has argued that there is an ‘owner-
manager conflict’ at the firm level, with managers being in favour of long-run growth of the 
firm, whereas shareholders rather look at the short-run development of stock values. 
Similarly, Stockhammer (2004, 2005-6) holds that firms typically face a ‘growth-profit trade-
off’, with managements usually advocating growth (accumulation) and shareholders (short-
                                                 
2 See the surveys by Arestis/Sawyer (2005a), Demetriadis/Adrianova (2004), Hein (2005), and Levine (2003, 
2005). 
3 Whereas the earlier Post-Keynesian and Kaleckian models of distribution and growth were missing an explicit 
introduction of monetary and financial variables at all, with the exception of Pasinetti’s (1974: 139-141) natural 
rate of growth models, these variables have been introduced into those models since the late 1980s/early 1990s 
by different authors. However, the focus in these models has mainly been on the introduction of the rate of 
interest, as an exogenous distribution parameter determined by central bank policies, and bank credit, created 
endogenously by a developed banking sector on demand by creditworthy borrowers. See the contributions by, 
among others, Dutt (1989, 1992, 1995), Dutt/Amadeo (1993), Epstein (1992, 1994), Godley/Lavoie (2007), Hein 
(2006, 2007, 2008), Lavoie (1992: 347-371, 1993, 1995), Lavoie/Godley (2001-2), 
Lavoie/Rodriguez/Seccareccia, (2004), Lima/Meirelles (2006, 2007), Smithin (2003a, 2003b), and Taylor (1985, 
2004: 272-278). 
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term) profit maximisation.4 A similar view of shareholder value orientation underlies the 
theoretical analyses by Aglietta/Breton (2001) and Boyer (2000), where shareholders impose 
a ‘financial norm’ on managements which, ceteris paribus, affects investment adversely. 
 
A second aspect of financialisation stressed in various models is the link between wealth, 
household indebtedness and consumption. Dutt (2005, 2006) has analysed the effects of easier 
access to consumer credit associated with deregulation of the financial sector within a 
Steindlian model of growth and income distribution. Credit-based consumption is facilitated 
by the deregulation of the financial system allowing home equity lending, adjustable 
consumer loans and securitization. Bhaduri/Laski/Riese (2006) also focus on the wealth-effect 
on consumption, implying that increases in financial wealth stimulate households’ willingness 
to consume. However, stock market wealth is purely ‘virtual wealth’ and increasing 
consumption is hence associated with increasing indebtedness of private households. 
Therefore, financial deregulation may improve the perspectives of maintaining a wealth-based 
credit boom over a considerable period of time. However, it may well be possible that the 
expansionary effects of consumer borrowing are overwhelmed in the long-run by rising 
interest obligations, which reduce households’ creditworthiness and may eventually require 
higher saving by households (Bhaduri/Laski/Riese 2006). Or, as in Dutt’s (2006) model, 
where the burden of servicing debt falls exclusively upon workers, the potentially 
contractionary long-run effect of consumer borrowing is corroborated because income is 
redistributed to the rich, who receive the interest income and have a lower propensity to 
consume. 
 
                                                 
4 Stockhammer (2004) also presents econometric evidence in favour of the hypothesis that financialisation 
caused a slowdown in accumulation for the US, France, and maybe also the UK. 
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Third, the effect of financialisation on different forms of income redistribution has recently 
been highlighted. On the one hand, it may be expected that shareholders’ demand of higher 
distributed profits will be passed through to workers with the effect of a declining share of 
wages in national income (Boyer 2000).5 On the other hand, a further implication of 
shareholder value orientation appears to be an increasing gap between manager salaries and 
blue collar wages. Palley (2006) and Lavoie (2006) have studied the phenomenon of 
‘cadrisme’ (Lavoie 2006) within the framework of Post-Keynesian models of growth and 
distribution and have derived different potential regimes for the effect of increasing manager 
salaries vis-à-vis blue collar wages. 
 
Based on the contradictory effects of ‘financialisation’ on investment and consumption, some 
authors have considered the possibility of a ‘finance-led growth regime’ (Boyer 2000), in 
which shareholder value orientation has an overall positive impact on growth. The condition 
for this is a very high propensity to consume out of rentiers’ income and/or a very strong 
wealth effect on consumption, which in turn also stimulates investment via the accelerator 
mechanism and overcompensates the direct negative effect of shareholder value orientation on 
investment (see also Aglietta 2000, Stockhammer 2005-6). Van Treeck (2008b), applying 
Lavoie’s (1995) ‘Minsky-Steindl-model’ and a monetary extension of the Bhaduri/Marglin 
(1990) model by Hein (2007), and distinguishing dividend payments/income from interest 
payments/income in the investment and the saving function of the model, has derived an 
‘intermediate’ case, already inherent in Hein’s (2007) and Lavoie’s (1995) models.6 In this 
‘intermediate’ case, rising interest or dividend payments of firms to rentiers are associated 
with a rising profit rate (and with a rising rate of capacity utilisation in the extension of Hein’s 
                                                 
5 For empirical results see Argitis/Pitelis (2001), Epstein/Power (2003), Dumenil/Levy (2004, 2005), 
Epstein/Jayadev (2005), and Power/Epstein/Abrena (2003). 
6 As in Lavoie (1995) and in Hein (2007), the model also has a ‘normal’ case with a negative effect of an 
increasing dividend (or interest) rate on the rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation 
throughout, and a ‘puzzling’ case with a positive effect on each of these rates. 
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(2007) model), but with a falling rate of capital accumulation.7 Given a specific parameter 
constellation, a regime of ‘profits without investment’ seems to be a viable accumulation 
constellation. Since van Treeck (2008b) has not integrated the effects of changes in dividend 
payments on the firms’ mark-up and hence on distribution between capital and labour income, 
Hein/van Treeck (2007) have allowed for a dividend-elastic mark up in two different variants 
of a Kaleckian model of distribution, the stagnationist version, building on Hein (2006), and 
the extended Bhaduri/Marglin version, building on Hein (2007). They show that with a 
dividend-elastic mark-up the ‘intermediate’ case of ‘profits without investment’ is still 
possible, but less likely, in particular in the extended ‘stagnationist’ version of the Kaleckian 
model.  
 
However, a major drawback of the Hein/van Treeck (2007) paper, as of many of the papers 
mentioned above, is that the effects of a change in the dividend rate on the debt- and the 
equity-capital ratios of the models is not considered explicitly. This means that those models 
are either very short-run in which those effects may be omitted. This, however, is hardly to 
square with the obtained conclusions with respect to medium- or even long-run viability (or 
non-viability) of a ‘finance-led’ or a ‘profits without investment’ regime. Or those models 
only deal with a very special case in which debt- and equity-capital-ratios are not affected by 
changes in dividend payments in the medium to long run. In the present paper we therefore 
attempt to move a step forward and we endogenise the debt- and the equity-capital-ratios in 
the medium run of the model in order to check the stability and viability of ‘finance-led’ and 
‘profits without investment’ regimes. Our model has a medium-run horizon because we allow 
the debt and the equity-capital held by outside rentiers to vary relative to the capital stock, but 
                                                 
7 This ‘intermediate’ case of weak investment in the face of prospering profits seems to have been dominating 
the development in the US since the early 1980s, only interrupted by the new economy boom in the second half 
of the 1990s. In Germany, a similar development can be seen, interrupted by the unification boom of the early 
1990s. See van Treeck/Hein/Dünhaupt (2007) and van Treeck (2008a) for a detailed analysis. 
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we assume that changes in the dividend rate (relative to the interest rate) do not affect 
households’ portfolio choice between credit/bonds and shares. In our view, portfolio choice is 
dominated by long-run institutional and habitual factors, such as the pension system and the 
stock market culture. Therefore, although endogenously determined, the debt- and the 
rentiers’ equity capital-ratios move in step in our model with the firms’ equity-capital-ratio 
being the complementary variable. 
 
The approach pursued here is different from other Post-Keynesian models taking into account 
stock-flow interactions of financial and real variables, as the ones by Skott (1988, 1989: 114-
140), Skott/Ryoo (2007, 2008), Lavoie (1998), Lavoie/Godley (2001-2), Taylor (2004: 272-
278), and van Treeck (2007). In these models, Tobin’s q (or Kaldor’s valuation ratio) has a 
prominent role to play, with positive effects, in particular, on investment but also on 
consumption, which then often dominate the overall results.8 However, we doubt especially 
that an increasing Tobin’s q triggered by increasing shareholder power and enforced changes 
in management’s preferences should be associated with rising real investment.9 These models 
also do not pay any attention to changes in distribution between capital and labour caused by 
changes in the financial regime and the related macroeconomic effects via consumption and 
investment. 
 
The present paper is organised as follows. In the second section we present the basic model. 
The short-run effects of increasing shareholder power vis a vis firms’ management and labour 
are analysed in the third section, assuming the mark-up in firms’ pricing decisions, and hence 
the profit share, as well as the debt- and the equity capital ratios to be constant. In the fourth 
                                                 
8 On Tobin’s q see Brainard/Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969). For a discussion see Crotty (1990) and 
Tobin/Brainard (1990). On Kaldor’s valuation ratio see Kaldor (1966) and the discussion in Lavoie (1998). 
9 Empirical studies have difficulties in finding a statistically significant and empirically relevant effect of Tobin’s 
q on investment. See, for example, Chirinko (1993), Bhaskar/Glyn (1995), and Ndikumana (1999). 
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section discussing the medium-run effects of increasing shareholder power we allow for a 
dividend elastic mark-ups and profit share, and we endogenise the development of the debt- 
and the equity-capital ratios. In particular, we analyse the stability of the medium-run 
equilibrium. In the fifth section we discuss the stability and viability of a ‘finance-led’ and a 
‘profits without investment’ regime. The sixth section concludes. 
 
 
2. The basic model 
 
We assume a closed economy without economic activity of the state. Under given conditions 
of production, there is just one type of commodity produced which can be used for 
consumption and investment purposes. There is a constant relation between the employed 
volume of labour (L) and real output (Y), i.e. there is no overhead-labour and no technical 
change, so that we get a constant labour-output-ratio (l). The capital-potential output-ratio (v), 
the relation between the real capital stock (K) and potential real output (Yv), is also constant. 
The capital stock is assumed not to depreciate. The rate of capacity utilisation (u) is given by 
the relation between actual real output and potential real output. The basic model can be 
described by the following equations: 
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Writing w for the nominal wage rate, we assume that firms set prices (p) according to a mark-
up (m) on constant unit labour costs up to full capacity output, with the mark-up being 
determined by the degree of price competition in the goods markets and by the relative 
powers of capital and labour in the labour market (equation 1). The profit share (h), i.e. the 
proportion of profits (Π) in nominal output (pY), is therefore determined by the mark-up 
(equation 2). The profit rate (r) relates the annual flow of profits to the nominal capital stock 
(equation 3). 
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The pace of accumulation in our model is determined by firms’ decisions to invest, 
independently of saving, because firms have access to short-term (or initial) finance for 
production purposes supplied by a developed banking sector.10 We assume that long-term 
finance of the capital stock consists of firms’ accumulated retained earnings (EF), long-term 
credit granted by rentiers’ households (directly or through banks) (B), or equity issued by the 
firms and held by rentiers’ households (ER). Part of firms’ liabilities is therefore held by 
‘outsiders’ to the firm, i.e. rentiers’ households, whereas another part is controlled by 
‘insiders’, either by the management or by owner managers. Since in our present model we 
assume prices in goods and financial markets to be constant – capital gains are hence omitted 
from the analysis –, rentiers are interested in short-run maximum dividend and interest 
payments, whereas management favours long-term growth of the firm.  are the debt-
capital-ratio, the rentiers’ equity-capital-ratio and the accumulated retained earnings-capital 
ratio, respectively (equations 5-7), the sum of which is of course: 
φγλ ,,
1=φ+γ+λ . We assume 
these ratios to be constant in the short run, but to be variable and hence endogenously 
determined in the medium run. 
 
Total profits (Π) split into firms’ retained profits (ΠF), on the one hand, and dividends paid on 
equity held by rentiers (Rd) as well as interest paid on debt (Ri), also accruing to rentiers’ 
households, on the other hand (equation 8). Interest payments to rentiers’ households are 
given by the rate of interest (i) and the stock of debt (equation 9), with the rate of interest as a 
distribution parameter being an exogenous variable mainly determined by monetary policies, 
following the Post-Keynesian ‘horizontalist’ view of endogenous money and credit, pioneered 
by Kaldor (1970, 1982, 1985), Lavoie (1984, 1992: 149-216, 1996), and Moore (1988, 
                                                 
10 The distinction between short-term (or initial) finance for production purposes and long-term (or final) finance 
for investment purposes, not dealt with in the present paper, can be found in the monetary circuit approach 
(Graziani 1989, 1994, Lavoie 1992: 151-169, Seccareccia 1996, 2003, Hein 2008: 70-79). 
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1989).11 Dividend payments are given by the dividend rate (d) and the stock of equity held by 
rentiers’ households (equation 10). We consider the dividend rate to be an exogenous variable 
as well. It is determined by the power struggle between rentiers (shareholders) and firms 
(management) with the rentiers being interested in high dividends for income purposes and 
the management being in favour of retained earnings for firms’ real investment and growth 
purposes. Finally, firms’ retained profits are given by the rate of profit on firms’ accumulated 
retained earnings (rF) and the stock of retained earnings. These are residual variables.12
 
Changes in the interest rate and in the dividend rate may be associated with a change in the 
mark-up in firms’ pricing in incompletely competitive goods market (equation 1), depending 
on the degree of competition in the goods market and the power of workers and labour unions 
in the labour market. If these changes occur, distribution between gross profits as the sum of 
retained profits, interest and dividends, on the one hand, and wages, on the other hand, will be 
affected (equation 2). Discussing the effects of a rising dividend rate in the following sections, 
we will distinguish two cases: 1. the dividend-inelastic mark-up in which a rising dividend 
rate leaves the profit share in national income untouched and only affects firms’ retained 
profits adversely, and 2. the dividend-elastic mark-up in which an increasing dividend rate 
affects distribution between gross profits and wages. The first case is likely to occur under the 
conditions of a high degree of competition in the goods market and strong labour unions in 
the labour market. The second case will emerge with a low degree of competition in the goods 
                                                 
11 In this view, the central bank controls the base rate of interest. Commercial banks set the market rate of 
interest by marking up the base rate, with the mark-up being affected by liquidity and risk assessments and by 
the degree of competition in the commercial banking sector, and then supply the credit demand of consumers 
and investors they consider creditworthy at this interest rate. The central bank accommodates the necessary 
amount of cash. For a survey of the Post-Keynesian endogenous money view and its implementation into Post-
Keynesian models of distribution and growth see Hein (2008). 
12 Dividing equation (8) by the nominal capital stock and taking into account equations (5) – (7), we obtain: 
. Since the rate of profit (r) is determined by the mark-up and by the goods market 
equilibrium, and the dividend rate and the interest rate are exogenous variables, the rate of profit on firms’ 
accumulated retained earnings cannot be exogenous, too, but is an endogenous or residual variable. 
λ+γ+φ= idrr F
 11
market and weak bargaining power of labour unions. In the face of increasing shareholder 
power, we consider the mark-up to be dividend inelastic in the short run, but to become 
dividend-elastic in the medium run of our model because of weakened bargaining power of 
labourers associated with financialisation and a policy of ‘downsize and distribute’ 
(Lazonick/O’Sullivan 2000). 
 
We assume a classical saving hypothesis, i.e. labourers do not save. The part of profits 
retained is completely saved by definition. The part of profits distributed to rentiers’ 
households, i.e. the interest and dividend payments, is used by those households according to 
their propensity to save (sR). Therefore, we get the saving rate (σ) in equation (12) which 
relates total saving to the nominal capital stock. Note that an increase in the dividend rate (and 
also the interest rate), ceteris paribus, decreases the saving rate because income is transferred 
from firms with a saving propensity of unity to rentiers’ households with a saving propensity 
of presumably less than unity.13
 
The accumulation rate (g), relating net investment (I) to the capital stock, in equation (13) is 
based on the ‘stagnationist’ Kaleckian distribution and growth models and is an extension of 
the function employed in Hein (2006). The basic elements follow the arguments in Kalecki 
(1954) rather closely and assume that investment decisions are positively affected both by 
expected sales and by retained earnings. Expected sales are determined by the rate of capacity 
utilisation. Retained earnings are given by the difference between profits and interest plus 
dividend payments, with each variable being normalised by the capital stock. Therefore, an 
increase in the interest rate or in the dividend rate has a negative impact on investment 
                                                 
13 In our model, we consider only rentiers’ consumption out of current income flows. With increasing stock 
prices, it can also be expected that rising (stock market) wealth further lowers the overall saving rate, in 
particular when households can borrow extensively against collateral, as described by Bhaduri/Laski/Riese 
(2006) and Dutt (2006). However, this will be associated with increasing household debt which might feed back 
negatively on consumption. This aspect is not modelled here. 
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because firms’ internal funds for investment finance are adversely affected. This also limits 
the access to external funds in imperfect capital markets, according to Kalecki’s (1937) 
‘principle of increasing risk’. Because of shareholders’ desire for profits – compared to 
managements’ desire for growth of the firm – increasing shareholder power vis-à-vis 
management will increase the dividend rate and reduce available funds for real investment 
and growth of the firm. But increasing shareholder power will not only affect internal funds 
but also managements’ preferences: Managements’ ‘animal spirits’ reflected in the constant α 
in the investment function will decline and might even become negative. Therefore, even if 
the availability of internal funds were irrelevant for firms’ investment decisions, increasing 
shareholder power would affect investment nonetheless in the negative through this channel.  
 
We refrain from integrating a positive effect of the relationship between the dividend rate and 
the rate of interest or of Tobin’s q or Kaldor’s valuation ratio into our investment function, 
because in our model an increase in the dividend rate (relative to the interest rate) indicates 
rising shareholder power vis a vis management and can hence not be seen as a stimulus for 
real investment, we rather assume the opposite. In our model, the shares of internal and 
external investment finance matter for firms’ real investment, but the source of external 
finance (issue of shares or debt) is of minor relevance for investment decisions. Our approach 
differs from other Post-Keynesian stock-flow consistent models in which Tobin’s q or 
Kaldor’s valuation ratio have a prominent role to play and have major effects on the overall 
results (Skott 1988, 1989: 114-140, Skott/Ryoo 2007, 2008, Lavoie 1998, Lavoie/Godley 
2001-2, Taylor 2004: 272-278, and van Treeck 2007). 
 
The goods market equilibrium is determined by the equality of saving and investment 
decisions (equation 14). The goods market stability condition requires that the saving rate 
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responds more elastically to changes in capacity utilisation than capital accumulation does 
(equations 15). 
 
Our model generates the following goods market equilibrium values: 
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In what follows, the effects of increasing shareholder power on stable goods market equilibria 
only will be discussed. Increasing shareholder power will first affect managements’ 
preferences and hence ‘animal spirits’ in the negative, and, secondly it will be associated with 
an increasing dividend rate. The interest rate will be considered to remain constant throughout 
the following analysis. 
 
 
3. Short-run effects of increasing shareholder power 
 
For the discussion of the short-run effects of increasing shareholder power we assume φγλ ,,  
to be given and constant. For the medium run these ratios will be endogenised, their stabilities 
will be checked, and the effects of changes in the dividend rate on these ratios will be 
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examined. For the short run we will also assume that firms are unable to shift increasing 
dividend payments to prices. The mark-up and the profit share will therefore remain constant, 
too. This restriction will also be alleviated for the medium-run considerations, and the effects 
of redistribution between capital and labour on investment and saving will be taken into 
account.  
 
An increase in shareholder value orientation of managements’ investment decisions, and 
hence a decrease in animal spirits, as indicated by α in the investment function, has uniquely 
negative effects on the endogenous variables, because animal spirits display unambiguously 
positive relationships with the equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital 
accumulation: 
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An increase in the dividend rate, however, has ambiguous effects. It affects firms’ investment 
through the availability of internal funds and the access to external financing, but it also has 
an influence on the income of rentiers households and hence on consumption. With the debt- 
and the rentiers’ equity-capital ratios, as well as the mark-up and the profit share, being 
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constant in the short run, we obtain the following effect of a change in the dividend rate on 
the equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation: 
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The effects of a change in the dividend rate may be positive or negative, depending on the 
parameter values in the saving and the investment function of the model. From equations (22), 
(23) and (24) we obtain the following conditions for positive effects of a rising dividend rate 
on the equilibrium values of the system: 
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Assuming the stability condition for the goods market equilibrium (equation 15) to hold 
implies for equation (24’): 1
v
h
v
h
>
ρ+β
.14 Therefore, we get the following short-run cases in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Short-run cases for a change in the dividend rate: constant interest rate, a 
dividend-inelastic profit share, and constant debt- and rentiers’ equity-capital-ratios 
 The ‘normal’ case The ‘intermediate’ case The ‘puzzling’ case 
 ρ<− Rs1  
v
h
v
h
s1 R
ρ+β
ρ<−<ρ  Rs1
v
h
v
h
−<
ρ+β
ρ  
d
u
∂
∂  – + +  
d
r
∂
∂  – + + 
d
g
∂
∂  – – + 
 
The ‘normal’ case of a negative impact of an increase in the dividend rate throughout on the 
real equilibrium values of capacity utilisation, the profit rate and the rate of capital 
accumulation will be given if: ρ<− Rs1 . Therefore, this case is the more likely the higher the 
rentiers’ propensity to save and the higher the responsiveness of firms’ real investment with 
respect to internal funds. With this parameter constellation the increase in consumption 
demand associated with the redistribution of income from firms to shareholder households, 
triggered by a rising dividend rate, is insufficient to compensate for the negative effects on 
firms’ investment. In the ‘normal case’, the effect of an increasing dividend rate on the 
equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation amplifies the negative 
effects of rising shareholder power via managments’ animal spirits. 
 
                                                 
14 From the stability condition (1-ρ)(h/v) - β > 0, we get (h/v) - ρ(h/v) > β, and hence (h/v) > β + ρ(h/v). 
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In the ‘puzzling’ case, we have an opposite parameter constellation: Rs1
v
h
v
h
−<
ρ+β
ρ . A low 
propensity to save out of rentiers’ income, a low responsiveness of investment with respect to 
internal funds and a high elasticity with respect to capacity utilisation allow for a positive 
effect of an increasing dividend rate on the equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, profit and 
capital accumulation. In the ‘puzzling case’, the effect of an increasing dividend rate on the 
equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation may compensate or 
even over-compensate the negative effects of rising shareholder power via managments’ 
animal spirits, and an overall positive effect of increasing shareholder power may be possible. 
This, however, requires that increasing shareholder power is associated with a strong increase 
in the dividend rate but with a low decline in animal spirits. If this conditions holds, we will 
obtain a ‘finance-led’ accumulation regime. 
 
In the model, an ‘intermediate’ case may arise if: 
v
h
v
h
s1 R
ρ+β
ρ<−<ρ . In this case, an 
increase in the dividend rate is accompanied by a rising rate of capacity utilisation and a rising 
rate of profit due to improved capacity utilisation, but by a falling equilibrium rate of capital 
accumulation. What is required for the ‘intermediate’ case, on the one hand, is a low rentiers’ 
propensity to save, which boosts consumption demand in the face of a rising dividend rate, 
and a low responsiveness of firms’ investment with respect to internal funds which limits the 
negative effects on firms’ investment. On the other hand, however, in the ‘intermediate’ case 
we have a low responsiveness of investment with respect to capacity utilisation which, in 
sum, is not able to over-compensate the negative effects of a rise in the dividend rate through 
internal funds. In the intermediate case, the negative effects of increasing shareholder power 
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via managements’s preferences (‘animal spirits’) may be compensated by the effects of a 
rising dividend rate with respect to capacity utilisation and the profit rate, but the negative 
effect on capital accumulation is reinforced. For the former, it is again required that increasing 
shareholder power is associated with a strong increase in the dividend rate but with a low 
reduction of animal spirits. If these conditions hold, we will obtain a ‘profits without 
investment’ regime. 
 
 
4. Medium-run effects of an increasing dividend rate 
 
In the medium run of our model we have to take into account that firms may be able to shift 
higher dividend payments to prices and that the mark-up, and hence the gross profit share 
(including dividend and interest payments), may increase. Therefore, with a dividend-elastic 
mark-up: 0
d
h ≥∂
∂ , and the labour income share may decrease in the face of a rising dividend 
rate. Retained profits of firms will then not have to carry the whole burden or may even 
remain constant. This case will be associated with low price competition in the goods market 
and weak labour unions in the labour market. In particular the latter seems to be closely 
related to increasing shareholder value orientation and decreasing ‘animal spirits’ of 
management with its negative effects on real investment, the expansion of the firm and hence 
employment (‘downsize and distribute’ instead of ‘retain and invest’, according to 
Lazonick/O’Sullivan (2000)). 
 
In the medium run, a change in the dividend rate affecting rentiers’ income will also affect 
rentiers’ saving and hence the stocks of debt and equity held by rentiers, as well as the 
rentiers’ equity- and the debt-capital-ratio. Since 1=φ+γ+λ , it is sufficient to analyse the 
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dynamics of  and . In order to do so, we have to make an assumption about rentiers’ 
portfolio decisions with respect to the allocation of saving to credit/bonds and equity granted 
to firms. We assume for the medium run that saving is split in fixed proportions (z, 1-z), so 
that we obtain for the changes in the respective stocks: 
λ γ
 
( ) 1z0,dEiBzszSB RRR ≤≤+==∆ ,      (25) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1z0,dEiBsz1Sz1E RRRR ≤≤+−=−=∆ .    (26) 
 
Treating the marginal relationship between debt and rentiers’ equity as a constant also implies 
that the relationship between the stock of debt and the stock of rentiers’ equity – and hence 
also between the debt-capital- and the rentiers’ equity-capital-ratio – is a constant: 
 
δ=−=γ
λ==∆
∆
z1
z
E
B
E
B
RR .         (27) 
 
Assuming the medium-run portfolio choice of households to be constant is justified by the 
observation that the portfolio choice seems to be dominated by institutional and historical 
factors which only change slowly in the course of time despite short- and medium-run 
variations in the dividend rate (relative to the interest rate). Medium-run portfolio choice 
seems to be dominated by institutional characteristics of the economy related to the pension 
system (pay as you go vs. capital based), and by historically given national stock market 
culture as well as sentiments towards risk.15 Be that as it may, changes in households’ 
portfolio decisions will only affect firms’ investment decisions in our model if firms’ internal 
                                                 
15 See van Treeck/Hein/Dünhaupt (2007) for a comparison of the development in Germany and the US. In 
Germany, direct and indirect holding of stock and shares by private households is still very low compared to the 
US and has developed rather slowly, although stock market prices have increased more than tenfold since the 
early 1980s. 
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means of finance are affected.16 But there is no effect via Tobin’s q or Kaldor’s valuation ratio 
in our investment function, different from the other stock-flow consistent approaches referred 
to above. 
 
For the growth of debt and equity held by rentiers we get from equations (25), (26), and (27): 
 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
δ+=
∆==∆= dizs
E
EEˆ
B
BBˆ RR
R
R .        (28) 
 
If we assume that prices remain constant, which means that mark-ups and distribution may 
change but not the price level, the growth rates of the debt-capital- and the rentiers’ equity-
capital-ratios depend on the growth rates of debt and rentiers’ equity, respectively, and on the 
growth rate of the real capital stock. From equations (5) and (6) we get: 
 
gBˆKˆBˆˆ −=−=λ ,          (29) 
gEˆKˆEˆˆ RR −=−=γ           (30) 
 
In equilibrium the endogenously determined values of λ and γ have to be constant, hence 
 has to hold. Introducing this condition into equations (29) and (30), and making use 
of equations (27), (28), and (18) yields the following medium-run equilibrium values: 
0ˆˆ =γ=λ
 
( ) ( )
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ρ−−β
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ρ−−βγ−α−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ β−ρ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
δ+=λ
v
hss1i
v
hss1d
v
h
v
h1dizs
*
RR
RRR
,    (31) 
                                                 
16 Firms internal means of finance will be affected by rentiers’ households’ portfolio choice if the dividend rate 
differs from the interest rate, which generally should be the case. 
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( ) ( )
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ρ−−β
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ρ−−βλ−α−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ β−ρ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
δ+=γ
v
hss1d
v
hss1i
v
h
v
h1dizs
*
RR
RRR
.    (32) 
 
These medium-run equilibrium values will be stable if 0
ˆ <λ∂
λ∂  and 0ˆ <γ∂
γ∂ , respectively. 
Starting from equations (29) and (30), making use of equations (27) and (28), respectively, 
and equation (18) yields: 
 
( )
( ) β−ρ−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ρ−−β−
=λ∂
λ∂
v
h1
v
hss1iˆ RR
,         (33) 
( )
( ) β−ρ−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ρ−−β−
=γ∂
γ∂
v
h1
v
hss1dˆ RR
.         (34) 
 
Taking into account that we assume stable goods market equilibria, it follows for the stability 
conditions of the debt-capital- and the rentiers’ equity-capital-ratios: 
 
( )
v
h
v
h
s1
0
v
hss1:if0
ˆ
,0
ˆ
R
RR
ρ+β
ρ>−⇔
>ρ−−β<γ∂
γ∂<λ∂
λ∂
      (33’, 34’) 
 
Stability of γ and λ requires a low rentiers’ propensity to save, a low responsiveness of firms’ 
investment with respect to internal funds and a high elasticity with respect to capacity 
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utilisation. This is tantamount to a positive partial relationship between the rate of capital 
accumulation and the debt-capital-ratio and the rentiers’ equity-capital-ratio, respectively. 
From equation (18) we obtain: 
 
( )
( ) β−ρ−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ρ−−β
=λ∂
∂
v
h1
v
hss1i
g
 
RR
,         (35) 
( )
( ) β−ρ−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ρ−−β
=γ∂
∂
v
h1
v
hss1d
g
 
RR
,         (36) 
( )
v
h
v
h
s1
0
v
hss1:if0
g
,0
g
R
RR
ρ+β
ρ>−⇔
>ρ−−β>γ∂
∂>λ∂
∂
     (35’, 36’) 
 
Note also that medium-run stability of the debt- and the rentiers’ equity-capital-ratio is 
associated with a short-run ‘puzzling’ effect of a change in the dividend rate on the 
equilibrium rate of capital accumulation, as can be seen in equation (24’). 
 
We are now in a position to discuss the medium-run effects of an increasing dividend rate on 
the equilibrium position of our system. We start with the effects of a rising dividend rate on 
the medium-run equilibrium rates of the debt- and the rentiers’ equity-capital-ratios. From 
equations (31) and (32), and taking into account that δ=− z1
z , we obtain the following 
effects of a change in the dividend rate on these ratios: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ρ−−β
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ α−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ λ+γρ+ρ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
δ+∂
∂+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ρ−−βγ−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ β−ρ−δ=∂
λ∂
v
hss1i
id1dizs
v
1
d
h
v
hss1
v
h1
zs
d
RR
RRR
R
, 
(37) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ρ−−β
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ α−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ λ+γρ+ρ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
δ+∂
∂+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ρ−−βγ−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ β−ρ−δ=∂
γ∂
v
hss1d
id1dizs
v
1
d
h
v
hss1
v
h1
zs
d
RR
RRR
R
. 
(38) 
 
For the evaluation of the effects of changing dividend rate we have to distinguish the 
medium-run stable from the medium-run unstable case.  
 
For the stable case, in which ( ) 0
v
hss1 RR >ρ−−β  has to hold, we obtain: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
.
ds
v
1
d
h
v
hss1
i1dizs
v
1
d
h
v
h1
zs
:and
,0
v
hss1:if
0
d
,0
d
RRR
R
R
RR
γ>
ρ∂
∂−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ρ−−β
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ α−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ λρ+ρ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
δ+∂
∂+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ β−ρ−δ
>ρ−−β
>∂
γ∂>∂
λ∂
 (37’, 38’) 
 
In the medium-run stable case, the effect of a change in the dividend rate on the debt- and 
rentiers’ equity-capital-ratio depends on the initial value of the rentiers’ equity-capital-ratio 
(and also on the initial value of the debt-capital-ratio because we have assumed δ=γ
λ  to be 
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constant in the medium run). If γ is below the value defined in equation (37’, 38’), an increase 
in the dividend rate will raise λ and γ, if γ is above this value λ and γ will fall, and if γ is 
exactly equal to this value there will be no effect of a change in the dividend rate on λ and γ. 
Note that a high elasticity of the mark-up and the profit share with respect to the dividend rate 
will increase the critical values in (37’) and (38’), whereas lower ‘animal spirits’ and hence 
increasing shareholder orientation of managements, will decrease these values. 
 
In the medium-run unstable case, in which ( ) 0
v
hss1 RR <ρ−−β , the inspection of equations 
(37) and (38) unambiguously yields: 
 
( ) 0
v
hss1:if0
d
,0
d RR
<ρ−−β<∂
γ∂<∂
λ∂ .    (37’’, 38’’) 
 
A change in the dividend rate will therefore have an adverse effect on the equilibrium debt- 
and the rentiers’ equity-capital-ratios. 
 
The total effects of change in the dividend rate on the equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, 
profit and capital accumulation can be derived from equations (16) - (18), taking now into 
account the potential medium-run effects on h, γ and λ: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) β−ρ−
ρ−∂
∂−ρ−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
λ∂+∂
γ∂+γ
=∂
∂
v
h1
u1
v
1
d
hs1
d
i
d
d
d
u R ,      (39) 
( )
( ) β−ρ−
β∂
∂−ρ−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
λ∂+∂
γ∂+γ
=∂
∂
v
h1
u
v
1
d
hs1
v
h
d
i
d
d
d
r R ,      (40) 
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( )
( ) β−ρ−
β∂
∂−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ρ−−β⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
λ∂+∂
γ∂+γ
=∂
∂
v
h1
v
u
d
h
v
hss1
d
i
d
d
d
g
 
RR
.     (41) 
 
From this, we obtain the following conditions for a medium-run expansionary effect of an 
increasing dividend rate: 
 
( )
d
i
d
d
1
v
u
d
h
s1:if,0
d
u
R
∂
λ∂+∂
γ∂+γ
ρ−∂
∂
+ρ>−>∂
∂ ,      (39’) 
d
i
d
d
h
u
d
h
s1:if,0
d
r
R
∂
λ∂+∂
γ∂+γ
β
∂
∂
+ρ>−>∂
∂ ,      (40’) 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
λ∂+∂
γ∂+γ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ρ+β
β
∂
∂
+
ρ+β
ρ>−>∂
∂
d
i
d
d
v
h
v
u
d
h
v
h
v
h
s1:if,0
d
g
R .   (41’) 
 
A change in the mark-up and hence in the gross profit share associated with a persistent 
increase in the dividend rate (and a decline in managements’ animal spirits) has a partially 
negative effect on each of the ‘real’ endogenous variables in the medium run. The model is 
hence unambiguously wage-led. Therefore, it seems that the ‘puzzling’ and the ‘intermediate’ 
case become less likely if this distribution effect is taken into account.  
 
For the (partial) effects of the changes in the debt- and the rentiers’ equity-capital ratios on the 
medium-run real equilibrium we obtain a differentiated picture: If the medium-run 
equilibrium is stable, and a rising dividend rate increases the debt- and the rentiers’ equity-
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capital ratios, this will accelerate the positive effect on the real equilibrium given in the short 
run in this case. If the effect of the dividend rate on γ and λ is zero there will be no further 
effect on u, g an r, and if γ and λ are negatively affected by a rise in the dividend rate, this will 
dampen the short-run effects. In the medium-run unstable case, the effect of a rising dividend 
rate on γ and λ will be unambiguously negative. This will dampen or reverse the short-run 
negative effects on the accumulation rate. The short-run effects of a rising dividend rate on 
capacity utilisation and the profit rate which may be negative or positive, will be dampened or 
even reversed, too. 
 
From these considerations it seems that the medium-run effects of a changing dividend rate on 
the rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation are rather opaque. However, 
seen from another angle, the picture becomes much clearer. From equations (27), (28), (29) 
and (30) we obtain for the medium-run equilibrium, in which the condition  has to 
hold: 
0ˆˆ =γ=λ
 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
δ+===
dizsEˆBˆg R
R .         (42) 
 
From this, the effect of a change in the dividend rate on the equilibrium rate of capital 
accumulation has to be positive in the medium run, in the stable and in the unstable case: 
 
0
zs
d
g R >δ=∂
∂ .          (43) 
 
Therefore, also equation (41) has to be positive. And if there is an overall positive effect of 
the dividend rate on the accumulation rate in the medium run, also the effect on the profit rate 
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and on the rate of capacity utilisation has to be positive, if only stable goods market equilibria 
are considered. For stable goods market equilibria it has to hold 1
v
h
v
h
>
ρ+β
 or 1
h
v
1 >
ρ+β
, 
and therefore if (41’) is positive, (40’) has to be positive, too. 
 
 
5. Short- and medium-run effects of increasing shareholder power 
 
We can now trace the effects of increasing shareholder power through our model and 
distinguish between short- und medium-run effects and between a stable medium-run 
equilibrium and an unstable one (Table 2). 
 
Starting with the medium-run stable case, we obtain that increasing shareholder power will be 
associated with decreasing managements’ animal spirits which will have a negative effect on 
the equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation, in the short and 
in the medium run. These negative effects may be compensated or even over-compensated by 
the positive effect of an increasing dividend rate on the real equilibrium, both in the short and 
in the medium run, provided that increasing shareholder power is associated with a strong 
increase in the dividend rate but with only a weak decline in animal spirits. A medium-run 
increase in the mark-up and the profit share, although having a partially negative effect on the 
goods market equilibrium will not prevent this result. The debt- and the rentiers’ equity-
capital-ratio will rise, fall or even remain constant, depending on the initial values of these 
ratios, which implies that the equilibrium values of these ratios will converge towards some 
definite values and then remain inelastic with respect to further changes in the dividend rate.  
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Table 2: Effects of increasing shareholder power in the short and the medium run 
( )
v
hss1 RR ρ−−β   
+ – 
Short run   
Dividend rate, 
profit share, 
debt- and the 
rentiers’ equity-
capital-ratio 
d
,
d
,
d
h
∂
γ∂
∂
λ∂
∂
∂  
(short run) 
0 0 
Animal spirits, 
goods market 
equilibrium 
α∂
∂
α∂
∂
α∂
∂ g,r,u  
(19), (20), (21) 
+ + 
Dividend rate, 
equilibrium 
capacity 
utilisation and 
profit rate 
d
r,
d
u
∂
∂
∂
∂  
(22), (23) 
+ +/– 
Dividend rate, 
equilibrium 
capital 
accumulation 
d
g
∂
∂  
(24) 
+ – 
Medium run   
Stability of debt- 
and rentiers’ 
equity-capital-
ratio 
γ∂
γ∂
λ∂
λ∂ ˆ,ˆ  
(33), (34) 
– 
(stable) 
+ 
(unstable) 
Animal spirits, 
goods market 
equilibrium 
α∂
∂
α∂
∂
α∂
∂ g,r,u  
(19), (20), (21) 
+ + 
Dividend rate, 
profit share d
h
∂
∂  
(medium run) 
+ + 
Dividend rate, 
and equilibrium 
debt- and 
rentiers’ equity-
capital-ratio 
d
,
d ∂
γ∂
∂
λ∂  
(37), (38) 
+/0/– – 
Dividend rate, 
equilibrium 
capacity 
utilisation and 
profit rate 
d
r,
d
u
∂
∂
∂
∂  
(39), (40) 
+ + 
Dividend rate, 
equilibrium 
capital 
accumulation 
d
g
∂
∂  
(41), (43) 
+ + 
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From this it follows that a ‘finance-led’ accumulation regime is a viable regime, not only in 
the short but also in the medium run, provided that the positive effect of increasing 
shareholder power via the dividend rate is strong enough to over-compensate the negative 
effect via managements’ preferences. If, however, the negative effect of increasing 
shareholder power on managements’ preferences exceeds the positive effect via the increasing 
dividend rate, it will be impossible to reach the medium-run equilibrium, because medium-run 
stability requires an overall positive effect of rising shareholder power on capital 
accumulation, and the system will turn unstable with the consequences discussed below. 
Therefore, medium-run viability of a finance-led regime characterised by high or rising rates 
of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation requires, in particular, a low rentiers’ 
propensity to save, a low elasticity of investment with respect to internal funds and a high 
responsiveness with respect to capacity utilisation. In addition, also weak effects of rising 
shareholder power on managements’ preferences are required. 
 
In the medium-run unstable case, the short-run negative effects of rising shareholder power on 
the real equilibrium via managements’ preferences are reinforced by the effects of an 
increasing dividend rate with respect to capital accumulation. The effects of the increasing 
dividend rate on the rates of capacity and profit may be negative, which will then give the 
‘normal’ case, or they may be positive and even over-compensate the negative effect of 
increasing shareholder power on managements’ animal spirits, and the ‘intermediate’ case or 
the ‘profits without investment’ regime is obtained. The negative effect of decreasing animal 
spirits associated with rising shareholder power is maintained in the medium run of the 
unstable case, too. In the medium run, with an increasing profit share, the increase in the 
dividend rate causes the equilibrium debt- and rentiers’ equity-capital-ratios to fall and the 
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equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation to rise. Therefore, 
considering equilibrium situations, the short-run ‘normal’ and ‘intermediate’ cases seem to 
vanish in the medium run. However, these medium-run equilibria will not be reached if the 
system is in disequilibrium.  
 
If we start in medium-run equilibrium and consider an increase in shareholder power and the 
dividend rate, this will have the potential short-run effects outlined above, and it will decrease 
the medium-run equilibrium debt- and rentiers’ equity-capital ratios and increase the medium-
run rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation. Actual debt- and rentiers’ 
equity-capital ratios will therefore exceed their new medium-run equilibrium values, and 
actual rates of capital accumulation and also of capacity utilisation and profit will fall short of 
their new medium-run equilibrium values. Therefore, a disequilibrium process with rising 
debt- and rentiers’ equity-capital-ratios – and falling firms’ equity-capital-ratios – and 
decreasing rates of capital accumulation, profit and capacity utilisation will be triggered by an 
increasing dividend rate. Deteriorating managements’ animal spirits will reinforce this 
cumulative disequilibrium process. In this process, the economy will also be characterised by 
the macroeconomic ‘paradox of debt’, i.e. rising debt-capital-ratios in the face of falling rates 
of capital accumulation. 
 
Therefore, if rising shareholder power, and hence decreasing ‘animal spirits’ and an 
increasing dividend rate, is associated with an ‘intermediate’ case of rising rates of capacity 
utilisation and profits but a falling rate of capital accumulation in the short run, this will 
inevitably turn into a ‘normal’ disequilibrium process of falling rates of capital accumulation, 
profit and capacity utilisation, accompanied by a rising share of profit, by rising debt- and 
rentiers’ equity-capital-ratios and by falling firms’ equity-capital ratios. The ‘intermediate’ or 
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‘profits without investment’ case does therefore not only require very special conditions in the 
short run, it is also a highly unstable and fragile regime when it comes to medium-run 
considerations. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have discussed the effects of rising shareholder power on distribution and 
capital accumulation in a Kaleckian model. Increasing shareholder power has been associated 
with the subordination of managements’ desire for growth under shareholders’ preference for 
short-term profits and hence with decreasing managements’ animal spirits, on the one hand, 
and increasing dividends distributed to shareholders, on the other hand. We have examined 
the short- and medium-run effects of these developments, assuming for the short run the 
firms’ mark-up and hence the profit share to be inelastic with respect to the dividend rate and 
the debt- and the rentiers’ equity-capital-ratio to be invariant, too. In the medium run the 
mark-up, and hence the profit share, has been assumed to be dividend elastic and the debt- 
and the rentiers’ equity-capital-ratio to be variable. However, we have supposed that 
households’ portfolio decisions remain unaffected by changes in the dividend rate (relative to 
the interest rate). This remains to be introduced into this model in order to consider the long-
run properties of the system. However, as long as households’ portfolio decisions have no 
effect on firms’ real investment decision, as supposed in our model, the long-run properties of 
the model will presumably not deviate from our medium-run results. 
 
In the short run, increasing shareholder power may have a positive (‘puzzling’) effect on the 
equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation, if the negative 
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effects on managements’ animal spirits are over-compensated by the positive effects of a 
rising dividend rate on effective demand. The latter requires a very low rentiers’ propensity to 
save, a low elasticity of firms’ investment with respect to internal funds and a high elasticity 
with respect to capacity utilisation. In the medium run, these conditions give rise to stable 
debt- and rentiers’ equity-capital ratios, and the ‘finance-led’ accumulation regime may be 
maintained, provided that the positive effect of increasing shareholder power via the dividend 
rate is strong enough to over-compensate the negative effect via managements’ preferences. 
 
The short run may also give rise to the normal and the ‘intermediate’ case. In the normal case 
increasing shareholder power has a depressing effect on the real equilibrium. The negative 
impact on managements’ animal spirits is reinforced by a negative demand effect of 
increasing dividend rates, due to a high shareholders’ propensity to save and a high elasticity 
of firms’ investment with respect to internal funds. In the ‘intermediate’ or ‘profits without 
investment’ case there is only a negative effect on capital accumulation, but a positive effect 
on capacity utilisation and the rate of profit, due to a low rentiers’ propensity to save, but a 
low elasticity of investment concerning capacity utilisation and a high responsiveness to 
internal funds. In the medium run, the debt- and the rentiers’ equity capital ratios are highly 
unstable in this case, and a rising dividend rate will trigger cumulative disequilbrium 
processes characterised by falling rates of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation, 
and rising debt- and rentiers’ equity capital-ratios, and hence by the macroeconomic ‘paradox 
of debt’. The effects of rising shareholder power on managements’ preferences will accelerate 
this process. Therefore, the intermediate or ‘profits without investment’ case is only a short-
lived phenomenon in our model and will trigger highly unstable disequilibrium processes in 
the medium run.  
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Finally, it should be noted that these instability properties are supplemented by further 
problems, not explicitly addressed in the present paper: An ‘intermediate’ or ‘profits without 
investment’ regime, if it prevails for a certain period of time, will be characterised by weak 
real investment, weak capital stock growth and slow productivity growth, as far as the latter is 
embodied in capital stock. Although generating a high level of activity and a high profit rate 
in the short run, this regime will therefore face medium to long-run growth, employment and 
inflation problems caused by weak capital stock growth.17
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